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EXAMINER

FISCHER, ANDREW J

ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
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3627

DATE MAILED: 06/02/2004

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Office Action Summary

Application No.

10/038,292

Applicant(s)

DAVIS ET AL.

Examiner

Andrew J. Fischer

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-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133). Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☒ Responsive to communication(s) filed on 16 March 2004.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☒ Claim(s) 1-20 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) 6-20 is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☒ Claim(s) 1-5 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) _____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claim(s) _____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☒ The drawing(s) filed on 08 April 2003 is/are: a) ☒ accepted or b) ☐ objected to by the Examiner.
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).
- 11) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 12) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).
- a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. _____.
3. ☐ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
- * See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.

Attachment(s)

- 1) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 2) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 3) ☒ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date 8.
- 4) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413)
Paper No(s)/Mail Date. _____.
- 5) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 6) ☐ Other: _____.

DETAILED ACTION

Acknowledgements

1. Applicants' amendment filed March 16, 2004 (Paper No. 9) is acknowledged. Accordingly, claims 1-20 remain pending.
2. The examiner for this application has changed. Please indicate Examiner Andrew J. Fischer as the examiner of record in all future correspondences.
3. This Office Action is written in OACS. Because of this, the Examiner is unable to control formatting, paragraph numbering, font, spelling, line spacing, and/or other word processing issues. The Examiner sincerely apologies for these errors.

Restriction

4. Because newly submitted claims 6-20 are directed to an invention that is independent or distinct from the invention originally claimed, restriction to one of the following inventions is required now under 35 U.S.C. §121:
 - I. Claims 1-5, drawn to a method of equipment management, classified in class 705, subclass 30.
 - II. Claims 6-15, drawn to a method of filtering inventory, classified in class 705, subclass 28.
 - III. Claims 16-20, drawn to a method of determining the authenticity of a piece of equipment, classified in class 705, subclass 7.
5. Inventions I and II are related as combination (Invention I) and subcombination (Invention II). Inventions in this relationship are distinct if it can be shown that (1) the combination as claimed does not require the particulars of the subcombination as claimed for patentability, and (2) that the

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subcombination has utility by itself or in other combinations (MPEP § 806.05(c)). In the instant case, the combination as claimed does not require the particulars of the subcombination as claimed because combination as claimed does not require the particulars of the subcombination—namely the combination does not require classifying the piece of equipment as a disposal item if the piece of equipment is broken. The subcombination has separate utility such as determining which equipment has been broken during use.

6. Because these inventions are distinct for the reasons given above, because these inventions have acquired a separate status in the art as shown by their different classification and divergent subject matter, and because the search required for Group I is not required for Group II, restriction for examination purposes as indicated is proper.

7. Inventions I and III are related as subcombinations disclosed as usable together in a single combination. The subcombinations are distinct from each other if they are shown to be separately usable. In the instant case, Invention III has separate utility such as determining a monetary value of a piece of equipment. See MPEP §806.05(d).

8. Because these inventions are distinct for the reasons given above, because these inventions have acquired a separate status in the art as shown by their different classification and divergent subject matter, and because the search required for Group I is not required for Group III, restriction for examination purposes as indicated is proper.

9. Inventions II and III are related as subcombinations disclosed as usable together in a single combination. The subcombinations are distinct from each other if they are shown to be separately usable. In the instant case, Invention III has separate utility such as determining a monetary value of a piece of equipment. See MPEP §806.05(d).

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10. Because these inventions are distinct for the reasons given above, because these inventions have acquired a separate status in the art as shown by their different classification and divergent subject matter, and because the search required for Group II is not required for Group III, restriction for examination purposes as indicated is proper.

11. Since Applicants have received an action on the merits for the originally presented invention, this invention has been constructively elected by original presentation for prosecution on the merits. Accordingly, claims 6-20 are withdrawn from consideration as being directed to a non-elected invention. See 37 C.F.R. §1.142(b) and MPEP §821.03.

12. Applicants are reminded that upon Applicants' cancellation of claims to a non-elected invention, the inventorship must be amended in compliance with 37 C.F.R. §1.48(b) if one or more of the currently named inventors is no longer an inventor of at least one claim remaining in the application. Any amendment of inventorship must be accompanied by a request under 37 C.F.R. §1.48(b) and by the fee required under 37 C.F.R. §1.17(i).

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §101

13. 35 U.S.C. §101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

14. Claims 3-5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 because the claimed invention is directed to non-statutory subject matter. The basis of this rejection is set forth in a two-prong test:

- (1) The invention must be within the technological arts; and
- (2) The invention must produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.

15. Prong (1) requires the claimed invention to be within the technological arts. See *In re Musgrave*, 431 F.2d 882, 167 USPQ 280, 289-90 (C.C.P.A. 1970); and *In re Johnston*, 502 F.2d

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765, 183 USPQ 172, 177 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Mere abstract ideas (*i.e.*, laws of nature, natural phenomena) that do not apply, involve, use, or advance the technological arts fail to promote the “progress of science and the useful arts”¹ and are therefore non-statutory subject matter.²

For a process, the claimed process must somehow apply, involve, use, or advance the technological arts. Mere intended or nominal use of a component—albeit within the technological arts—does not confer statutory subject matter to an otherwise abstract idea if the component does not apply, involve, use, or advance the underlying process. In other words, if the invention in the body of the claim is not tied to a technological art, environment, or machine, the claim is non-statutory. *Ex parte Bowman*, 61 USPQ2d 1665, 1671 (B.P.A.I. 2001) (Unpublished). See also MPEP §2106 IV B. 2 (b) ii). The Examiner recommends (by way of example only) *positive recitation* of a computer or other technology within the body of the claim if the specification supports such an amendment.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §112 2nd Paragraph

16. The following is a quotation of the 2nd paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

17. Claims 1-5 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §112, 2nd paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention. The claims are replete with errors. Some examples follow.

¹ It is the Examiner’s position that “technological arts” is synonymous with “useful arts” as stated in the U.S. Constitution, Art. I, §8. See *In re Waldbaum*, 457 F.2d 997, 173 USPQ 430, 434 (C.C.P.A. 1972).

² *E.g.*, the physical sciences are statutory; *c.f.*, social sciences which are non-statutory

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- a. In claim 1, it is unclear if the “asset-creating individual profile” in section h. is the same as “an individual profile” in section g. Because Applicants’ use “an” as a prefix to section h.’s “asset-creating individual profile,” it appears to be separate and independent of section g.’s “individual profile.” Appropriate correction is required.
- b. Also n claim 1, it is unclear if step m. will occur since step l. determines if the equipment is an asset. If the equipment is not an asset, step m. will never occur making the scope of claim 1 unclear. Applicants are reminded that “[l]anguage that suggest or makes optional but does not require steps to be performed or does not limit a claim to a particular structure does not limit the scope of a claim or claim limitation. [Emphasis in original.]” MPEP §2106 II C.
- c. Similarly in claim 2, it is unclear if step l. will occur since step k. determines if the equipment is an asset. If the equipment is not an asset, step l. will never occur making the scope of claim 2 unclear.
- d. Claims 3-5 are indefinite because the scope of the claims can not be determined. Should Applicants overcome the §101 rejections above, this particular §112 2nd paragraph rejection will also be withdrawn.
- e. Regarding claim 5, it is unclear if the “obtaining” and “matching” steps are ‘in replacement of’ or ‘in addition to’ the “making” step in claim 4.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §102

18. The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. §102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office Action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –

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(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for a patent.

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States. . . .

(e) the invention was described in (1) an application for patent, published under section 122(b), by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent or (2) a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention by the applicant for patent, except that an international application filed under the treaty defined in section 351(a) shall have the effects for purposes of this subsection of an application filed in the United States only if the international application designated the United States and was published under Article 21(2) of such treaty in the English language.

19. Claims 1-5, as understood by the Examiner, are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by Bowers et. al. (U.S. 6,195,006 B1) ("Bowers '006"). Bowers '006 discloses the claimed invention as previously discussed. Additionally, Bowers '006 the claimed flag setting steps since they are inherent in Bowers '006.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC §103

20. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. §103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office Action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

21. Claims 1-5, as understood by the Examiner, are alternatively rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable Bowers '006 in view of Conway (U.S. 5,732,401).³ It is the Examiner's principle position that the claims are anticipated because of the inerencies in Bowers '006. However if not inherent, it would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made to modify Bowers '006 as taught by Conway to include turning on a flag for a given item after the occurrence of a certain event and checking to see if the

³ See MPEP §2112 expressly authorizing alternative §102/§103 rejections when the question of inherency is present in the anticipation rejection.

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flag has been turned on. Such a modification would have disclosed known computer programming techniques. Additionally, such a modification would have provided additional information regarding the status of the items when determining whether or not to order new books or other items.

22. Additionally, the Examiner takes Official Notice of the following facts that are old and well known:

- i. The world has both asset creating individuals and non asset-creating individuals.
- ii. Sports teams must track equipment used in order to account for the value of the equipment.
- iii. Bar coding is used to track assets.
- iv. Flags are commonly used in computer programming to determine if a condition has occurred. See definition of flag provided, *infra*.

23. After careful review of the specification and prosecution history, the Examiner is unaware of any desire—either expressly or implicitly—by Applicants to be their own lexicographer and to define a claim term to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning. Therefore, the Examiner starts with the heavy presumption that all claim limitations are given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. See *Bell Atlantic Network Services Inc. v. Covad Communications Group Inc.*, 262 F.3d 1258, 1268, 59 USPQ2d 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is a heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.”); *CCS Fitness Inc. v. Brunswick Corp.*, 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 USPQ2d 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (There is a “heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary

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meaning.”). See also MPEP §2111.01 and *In re Zletz*, 893 F.2d 319, 321, 13 USPQ2d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 1989).⁴

In accordance with the ordinary and accustomed meaning presumption, during examination the claims are interpreted with their “broadest reasonable interpretation” *In re Morris*, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also MPEP §2111.

However, if Applicants disagree with the Examiner and have either (a) already used lexicography or (b) wish to use lexicography and therefore (under either (a) or (b)) desire a claim limitation to have a meaning other than its ordinary and accustomed meaning, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicants in their next response to expressly indicate⁵ the claim limitation at issue and to show where in the specification or prosecution history the limitation is defined. Such definitions must be clearly stated in the specification or file history. *Bell Atlantic*, 262 F.3d at 1268, 59 USPQ2d at 1870, (“[I]n redefining the meaning of particular claim terms away from the ordinary meaning, the intrinsic evidence must ‘clearly set forth’ or ‘clearly redefine’ a claim term so as to put

⁴ It is the Examiner's position that “plain meaning” and “ordinary and accustomed meaning” are synonymous. See e.g. *Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp.*, 274 F.3d 1336, 1342, 60 USPQ2d 1851, 1854 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A]ll terms in a patent claim are to be given their plain, ordinary and accustomed meaning . . .”).

⁵ “Absent an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning, terms in a claim are to be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Wenger Manufacturing Inc. v. Coating Mach. Sys., Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1225, 1232, 57 USPQ2d 1679, 1684 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations and quotations omitted). “In the absence of an *express intent* to impart a novel meaning to claim terms, an inventor's claim terms take on their ordinary meaning. We indulge a heavy presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary and customary meaning. [Emphasis added.]” *Teleflex Inc. v. Ficosa North America Corp.*, 299 F.3d 1313, 1325, 63 USPQ2d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations and quotations omitted).

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one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine the claim term”).⁶

The Examiner cautions that no new matter is allowed.

Applicants are reminded that failure by Applicants in their next response to properly traverse this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered a desire by Applicants to forgo lexicography in this application and to continue having the claims interpreted with their broadest reasonable interpretation.⁷ Additionally, it is the Examiner's position that the above requirements are reasonable.⁸ Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on claim interpretation principles applies to all examined claims currently pending.

24. To the extent that the Examiner's interpretations are in dispute with Applicants' interpretations, the Examiner hereby adopts the following definitions—under the broadest

⁶ See also *Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.*, 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996), (“[A] patentee may choose to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary meaning, *as long as* the special definition of the term is *clearly stated* in the patent specification or file history. [Emphasis added.]”); *Multiform Desiccants Inc. v. Medzam Ltd.*, 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 USPQ2d 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“Such special meaning, however, must be sufficiently clear in the specification that any departure from common usage would be so understood by a person of experience in the field of the invention.”). See also MPEP §2111.01, subsection titled “Applicant May Be Own Lexicographer” and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled “New Terminology.”

⁷ See 37 C.F.R. §1.104(c)(3) which states in part: “the examiner may rely upon admissions by applicant . . . as to *any matter* affecting patentability [Emphasis added.]”

⁸ The Examiner's requirements on this matter are reasonable on at least two separate and independent grounds. First, the Examiner's requirements are simply an express request for clarification of how Applicants intend their claims to be interpreted so that lexicography (or even an *attempt* at lexicography) by Applicants is not inadvertently overlooked by the Examiner. Second, the requirements are reasonable in view of the USPTO's goals of compact prosecution, productivity with particular emphasis on reductions in both pendency and cycle time, and other goals as outlined in the USPTO's The 21st Century Strategic Plan, February 3, 2003 available at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/index.htm (last accessed May 25, 2004).

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reasonable interpretation standard—in all his claim interpretations.⁹ Moreover, while the following list is provided in accordance with *In re Morris*, the definitions are a guide to claim terminology since claim terms must be interpreted in context of the surrounding claim language.¹⁰ Finally, the following list is not intended to be exhaustive in any way:

Asset “anything owned that has value; any interest in REAL PROPERTY or PERSONAL PROPERTY that can be used for payment of debts.” Dictionary of Business Terms, 3rd Edition, by Jack P. Friedman, Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., Hauppauge, N.Y., 2000.

Flag “1. Broadly, a marker of some type used by a computer in processing or interpreting information; a signal indicating the existence or status of a particular condition. Flags are used in such areas as communications, programming, and information processing.” Computer Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Microsoft Press, Redmond, WA, 1997.¹¹ **Computer:** “Any machine that does three things: accepts structured input, processes it according to prescribed rules, and produces the results as output.” *Id.*

⁹ While most definition(s) are cited because these terms are found in the claims, the Examiner may have provided additional definition(s) to help interpret words, phrases, or concepts found in the definitions themselves or in the prior art.

¹⁰ See e.g. *Brookhill-Wilk 1 LLC v. Intuitive Surgical Inc.*, 334 F.3d 1294, 1300, 67 USPQ2d 1132, 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (abstract dictionary definitions are not alone determinative; “resort must always be made to the surrounding text of the claims in question”).

¹¹ Based upon Applicants’ disclosure, the art of record, and the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in this art as determined by the factors discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* is an appropriate technical dictionary known to be used by one of ordinary skill in this art. See e.g. *Altiris Inc. v. Symantec Corp.*, 318 F.3d 1363, 1373, 65 USPQ2d 1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2003) where the Federal Circuit used the *Microsoft Press Computer Dictionary* (3d ed.) as “a technical dictionary” to define the term “flag.” See also *In re Barr*, 444 F.2d 588, 170 USPQ 330 (CCPA 1971)(noting that its appropriate to use technical dictionaries in order to ascertain the meaning of a term of art) and MPEP §2173.05(a) titled ‘New Terminology.’

Internet “The worldwide collection of networks and gateways that use the TCP/IP suite of protocols to communicate with one another. At the heart of the Internet is a backbone of high-speed data communication lines between major nodes or host computers, consisting of thousands of commercial, government, educational, and other computer systems, that route data and messages.” *Id.*

Individual “3 : existing as a distinct entity : separate” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 10th Edition, Merriam-Webster Inc., Springfield, M.A., 1997.

25. Functional recitation(s) using the word “for,” “capable,” or other functional terms (*e.g.* “for an asset-creating individual profile” as recited in claim 1) have been considered but given less patentable weight¹² because they fail to add any steps and are thereby regarded as intended use language. A recitation of the intended use of the claimed invention must result in additional steps. See *Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Laboratories, Inc.*, 246 F.3d 1368, 1375-76, 58 USPQ2d 1508, 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (Where the language in a method claim states only a purpose and intended result, the expression does not result in a manipulative difference in the steps of the claim.).

26. Additionally, the Examiner notes that “the PTO and the CCPA acknowledged product-by-process claims as an exception to the general rule requiring claims to define products in terms of structural characteristics.” *Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.*, 970 F.2d 834, 845, 23 USPQ2d 1481, 1490 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (hereinafter “*Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex I*”).

Furthermore, the Federal Circuit “acknowledges that it has in effect recognized . . . product-by-process claims as exceptional.” *Atlantic Thermoplastics v. Faytex I*, 970 F.2d at 847, 23 USPQ2d at 1491.

¹² See *e.g. In re Gulack*, 703 F.2d 1381, 217 USPQ 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(stating that although all limitations must be considered, not all limitations are entitled to patentable weight).

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Because of this exceptional status, the Examiner has carefully reviewed claims 1-5 and it is the Examiner's position that the claims *do not* contain any product-by-process limitations whether in a conventional format or otherwise. If Applicants disagree with the Examiner, the Examiner respectfully requests Applicants in their next properly filed response to expressly point out any product-by-process claim(s) and their limitations so that they may be afforded their exceptional status and treated accordingly. Applicants are reminded that "even though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself." *In re Thorpe*, 777 F.2d 695, 697, 227 USPQ 964, 966 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).¹³ Failure by Applicants in their next response to also address this issue in accordance with 37 C.F.R. §1.111(b) or to be non-responsive to this issue entirely will be considered intent by Applicants *not* to recite any product-by-process limitations. Unless expressly noted otherwise by the Examiner, the preceding discussion on product-by-process principles applies to all examined claims currently pending.

Response to Arguments

27. Applicants' arguments filed March 16, 2004 as part of Paper No. 9 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.

Prior Art

28. Applicants argue that Bowers '006 does not disclose an asset creating individual profile, recording the return of the equipment after the asset creating event, recording the usage in the asset

¹³ See also MPEP §2113.

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creating event and turning an event flag on the equipment on for the asset-creating event. The Examiner respectfully disagrees.

29. First, the profile of the book itself is an individual profile. Each book has its own profile. This includes all the bibliographic data and other information associated with a book. From the claim language, it is unclear if Applicants intended individual to mean in reference to a person. But because the claim language does not state such intent, the Examiner maintains his interpretation of “individual.” See *e.g. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni*, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248, 48 USPQ2d 1117, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[T]he claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim.”). Moreover, when a new book is purchased or enters the system, it must be given an ID before the public can check the book out.

30. Bowers '006 also discloses the return of the equipment (return of the book) after an asset-creating event (the asset-creating event is the use by a particular person). The recording the usage in the asset-creating event is inherent since the library doesn't care if the patron uses the book as a paper weight—the use is inherent. Simply by having the person check out the book, the library has record the usage of the book. Whether or not the patron actually reads the books is immaterial. And clearly the event flag is turned on after the patron checks out the book. Even if not inherent in Bowers '006, Conway teaches the uses of flags in computer systems.

31. Moreover, based upon the claim language, the asset creating event is an event which made the patron or library customer famous. The claims do not actually recite ‘*creating* the asset-creating event.’ After the asset-creating event is any event after the event that made the person famous. In this case, the checking out of the book by the famous person/patron is the recording the usage. For example, a book that at U.S. president kept overdue is the asset. So again, Applicants have not

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actually claimed creating the asset-creating event in at least claim 1. As Judge Clevenger has so eloquently summarized these types of arguments, “The invention disclosed in [Applicant’s] written description may be outstanding in its field, but the name of the game is the claim.” *In re Hiniker Co.*, 150 F.3d 1362, 1369, 47 USPQ2d 1523, 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Protest Under 37 C.F.R. §1.291

32. In accordance with MPEP §1900 and in particular MPEP §1901.06, the Examiner has carefully reviewed the Protest filed under 37 C.F.R. §1.291 by Ralph H. Dougherty (“Dougherty Protest”) as part of the Information Disclosure Statement (“IDS #3”) filed on January 20, 2004 (Paper No. 8).

33. However the Examiner finds that because the claims are indefinite under 35 U.S.C. §112 2nd paragraph, it is impossible to properly construe claim scope at this time. See *Honeywell International Inc. v. ITC*, 68 USPQ2d 1023, 1030 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because the claims are indefinite, the claims, by definition, cannot be construed.”). However, in accordance with MPEP §2173.06 and the USPTO’s policy of trying to advance prosecution by providing art rejections even though these claim are indefinite, the claims are construed and the art is applied *as much as practically possible*. Therefore the arguments articulated in the Dougherty Protest can not be fully discussed at this time. After Applicants overcome the 35 U.S.C. §112 2nd paragraph rejections, the Examiner will reassess the arguments in the Dougherty Protest. Prior to that, the Examiner nevertheless notes the following:

34. Regarding flags, flags are extremely common in computer programming.

35. Regarding asset creating events vs. non asset creating events, these are inherent in the prior art. All events are either asset-creating events or non asset-creating events. These terms are very

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broad. Non asset-creating include for example going to work, walking across a room, or contemplating the rise and fall of the Roman empire. Although very broad and diverse, these are non asset-creating events.

36. The other points noted in the Dougherty Protest will be discussed after Applicants overcome the 35 U.S.C. §112 2nd paragraph rejections.

37. Applicants' remaining arguments have been considered but are not persuasive.

Conclusion

38. The following references are considered pertinent to Applicants' disclosure: Lu et. al. (U.S. 6,686,881 B1); Young (U.S. 6,591,252 B1); Onozaki (U.S. 6,026,378); Markman (U.S. 5,794,213); Ruppert et. al. (U.S. 5,640,002); Patel et. al. (U.S. 5,288,980); Weiley (U.S. 5,050,031); and Gombrich et. al. (U.S. 4,857,716).

39. The following two (2) citations to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure ("MPEP") apply to this Office Action: MPEP citations to Chapters 200, 700, 1800, and 2100 are from the MPEP 8th Edition, Rev 1, February 2003. All remaining MPEP citations are from MPEP 8th Edition, August 2001.

40. In accordance with *In re Lee*, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344-45, 61 USPQ2d 1430, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Examiner finds that the references How Computers Work Millennium Ed. by Ron White; How Networks Work, Millennium Ed. by Frank J. Derfler et. al.; and How the Internet Works, Millennium Ed. by Preston Gralla are additional evidence of what is basic knowledge or common sense to one of ordinary skill in this art. Each reference is cited in its entirety. Moreover, because these three references are directed towards beginners (see *e.g.* "User Level Beginning . . ."), because of the references' basic content (which is self-evident upon review of the references), and after

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further review of the entire application and all the art now of record in conjunction with the factors as discussed in MPEP §2141.03 (where practical), the Examiner finds that these three references are primarily directed towards those of low skill in this art. Because these three references are directed towards those of low skill in this art, the Examiner finds that one of ordinary skill in this art must—at the very least—be aware of and understand the knowledge and information contained within these three references.

41. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (“PAIR”) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see <http://pair-direct.uspto.gov>. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).

42. In accordance with the USPTO’s goals of customer service, compact prosecution, and reduction of cycle time, the Examiner has made every effort to clarify his position regarding claim interpretation and any rejections or objections in this application. Furthermore, the Examiner has again provided Applicants with notice—for due process purposes—of his position regarding his factual determinations and legal conclusions. The Examiner notes and thanks Applicants for their “Remarks” (Paper No. 9, beginning on page 7) traversing the Examiner’s positions on various points. If Applicants disagree with any additional factual determination or legal conclusion made by the Examiner in this Office Action whether expressly stated or implied,¹⁴ the Examiner respectfully reminds Applicants to properly traverse the Examiner’s position(s) in accordance with 37 C.F.R.

¹⁴ *E.g.*, if the Examiner rejected a claim under §103 with two references, although not directly stated, it is the Examiner’s implied position that the references are analogous art.

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§1.111(b) in their next properly filed response. By addressing these issues now, matters where the Examiner and Applicants agree can be eliminated allowing the Examiner and Applicants to focus on areas of disagreement (if any) with the goal towards allowance in the shortest possible time. If Applicants have any questions regarding the Examiner's positions or have other questions regarding this communication or even previous communications, Applicants are strongly encouraged to contact Examiner Andrew J. Fischer whose telephone number is (703) 305-0292. If attempts to reach the Examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the Examiner's immediate supervisor, Robert Olszewski, can be reached at (703) 308-5183. The fax number for facsimile responses is now (703) 872-9306.



Andrew J. Fischer
Patent Examiner
Art Unit 3627

AJF
May 25, 2004